Defense Articles

The Cambodian government, with European Union assistance, on Wednesday destroyed 3,519 surplus military weapons in a large bonfire in Anlong Veng, a former Khmer Rouge stronghold in northern Cambodia, a senior Defense Ministry official said.

The ”Flame of Peace” destruction ceremony was participated in by about 3,000 people including foreign diplomats, government officials and villagers, said Maj. Gen. Son Kimsorn, director of the Defense Ministry’s military equipment department.

Anlong Veng was the last stronghold of Khmer Rouge supreme leader Pol Pot, who died there 1998. It is located in Udor Meanchey Province near the Thai border, about 100 kilometers north of the famed Angkor temple complex.

After 30 years of war, Cambodia’s peace and stability has been undermined by the continued availability and circulation of large quantities of weapons — legal and illegal.

Since May 1999, the government has been regularly holding public ceremonies to crush or burn surplus weapons or weapons confiscated from civilians.

With the latest one, the total number of weapons destroyed in such ceremonies would be over 154,000, mostly AK-47 and CKC rifles.

The weapons were destroyed in Anlong Veng under EU ASAT, a project name that stands for the European Union’s Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Kingdom of Cambodia.

David de Beer, EU ASAC project manager noted in a message delivered at the ceremony that Anlong Veng, as Pol Pot’s former stronghold, ”reminds many people in the country of the darkest period of Cambodian history.”

”It is a powerful message when we can say that the Royal Cambodian Government is destroying over 3,500 weapons in Anlong Veng,” he said. ”Anlong Veng used to be the symbol of war, but now through the Flame of Peace ceremony, Anlong Veng becomes part of the progress to peace.”

Since 2001, EU ASAC has supported the Cambodian government in destroying over 70,000 weapons in 25 Flame of Peace ceremonies. Between 65 percent and 80 percent of the weapons are said to be operational.

Another major activity of the EU ASAC program is helping the Defense Ministry implement a weapons registration and safe storage project for all small arms and light weapons under its control.

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, Second Edition 2002), 120 pp., $16.70.

THE DISTINGUISHED international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz (still) thinks that the emergence of new nuclear powers is not necessarily to be regretted. In a world of many nuclear powers, in Waltz’s view, a major war would be practically impossible. He therefore believes that “more may be better”–that what has come to be called “nuclear proliferation” might actually be a good thing. Scott Sagan, a professor of political science at Stanford University and a leading authority in the field of strategic studies, disagrees; in Sagan’s view, “more will be worse.” In 1995, Waltz and Sagan published The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, in which each laid out his argument and then responded to the other’s argument. The discussion was spirited and often quite interesting, and the book deservedly received a good deal of attention. A revised edition, with new passages on terrorism and missile defense and a new chapter on India and Pakistan, has just been published. Its appearance provides us with a timely opport unity to confront the proliferation question yet again–a chance to get to the bottom of what is perhaps the most important international issue the world will face in the years to come.

Why does Waltz think that the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily to be avoided? His fundamental claim is that nuclear forces have a very powerful deterrent effect, and that nuclear states would therefore be extremely reluctant to tangle with each other. If one such state does take aggressive action–if a nuclear Iraq invaded Kuwait, for example–other powers would find it too dangerous to use military force against the aggressor state, and would only be able to take non-military measures. If the United States at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 “had thought that Iraq might have had a few bombs, it would have had to manage the Iraq-Kuwait crisis differently, say by employing only an embargo.” If, however, by some chance a limited war between two nuclear states did break out, that conflict would be very unlikely to escalate. Escalation that threatened an adversary’s core interests, especially an invasion of the adversary’s homeland with conventional forces, would be “too risky to conte mplate.” But if a country’s core interests actually were threatened, then even that situation would scarcely lead to disaster. There would be no massive escalation. Instead nuclear weapons would be used in a very limited way. A “few judiciously delivered warheads” would in such circumstances be a very effective wake-up call, and would probably “bring rapid deescalation.”

A nuclear world, according to Waltz, is thus a world of safety nets beneath safety nets. In the unlikely event that serious problems between nuclear states developed at one level of conflict, the dangers would very probably be contained before matters escalated to the next level. The mere possession of a nuclear capability, Waltz says, induces “caution in any state” and “especially in weak ones.” A nuclear Iraq, he now writes (Libya was the state mentioned in the corresponding passage in the 1995 text), would actually be more cautious than a non-nuclear Iraq. The possession of nuclear weapons by an adversary, moreover, would have an extremely powerful deterrent effect. In Waltz’s view, “not much is required to deter.” “A low probability of carrying a highly destructive attack home”, he believes, “is sufficient for deterrence.” A large force is not necessary for this purpose; a relatively small number of bombs would do the trick. That small force, of course, would have to be able to survive an enemy attack, bu t since bombs can be small and light, they are “easy to hide and to move” and delivering them, even after a surprise attack, would not be hard to do. “Bombs can be driven in by trucks from neighboring countries”, he writes. “Ports can be torpedoed by small boats lying offshore.” Even “weak and poor states”, he writes, can “easily” build small, survivable nuclear forces, and when they do, they will deter even the strongest nuclear powers. With nuclear weapons, he says, “any state will be deterred by another state ’s second-strike forces.” Relative strength then no longer matters: “if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant.” “A minimal deterrent”, he writes, “deters as well as a maximal one.”

The atomic bomb, Waltz believes, is thus the great equalizer in international politics. It is not just that a small nuclear force is as good as a big one. He now argues (in two passages that did not appear in the 1995 text) that the presence of nuclear forces also makes disparities in conventional military power meaningless. “Nuclear weapons”, he says,

negate the advantages of conventional superiority because escalation in the use of conventional force risks receiving a nuclear strike. With nuclear weapons, not only is a small second-strike force equivalent to a large second-strike force but also small conventional forces are equivalent to large conventional forces because large forces cannot be used against a nuclear power.

In such a world, where neither the nuclear nor the conventional balance matters, the weak are as strong as the strong. Everyone is deterred–and deterred equally. No one will dare start a war, because the risks are so immense. There is thus practically no risk of war, or at any rate of a war in which nuclear weapons are used in a major way. In a nuclear world, a general war is a virtual “impossibility”; in such a world, “only limited wars can be fought” and “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero. Nuclear weapons are thus the great bulwark of international peace; and it is because they have such a powerfully stabilizing effect that in Waltz’s view the “gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”

SAGAN DOES NOT think a nuclear world would be nearly as stable as Waltz makes out. Indeed, looking at South Asia, he thinks that deterrence will eventually break down–that nuclear weapons will someday be used in a conflict between India and Pakistan. For him, the root problem with Waltz’s argument is the assumption that states are under very strong pressure to behave rationally, and that one can therefore assume that states in fact will act rationally. To Sagan, nuclear weapons are controlled by “imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations”, and, given the way large organizations actually work, such a high degree of rationality simply cannot be expected. Nuclear weapons are in the hands of professional military organizations, and those organizations behave in only “boundedly rational” ways that “are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental nuclear war.”

In the 1995 version of his essay, Sagan focused on three dangers resulting from the “wide-spread biases and imperfections in military organizations.” First was the problem of preventive war: when a country begins to build a nuclear force, one or more of its rivals might decide to launch an attack on that country’s nuclear facilities before it is too late. Military officers, Sagan argues, are particularly attracted to this kind of thinking, and this, he says, can be a real source of danger, especially in countries where the armed forces are not under firm civilian control. The second problem has to do with the survivability of a nuclear force. In a crisis, vulnerable forces might invite enemy attack, and for various organizational reasons, professional militaries, if left to themselves, might not actually build invulnerable forces. The third problem has to do with the possibility of a nuclear accident; this includes the problem of unauthorized use, since such use is “accidental” from the standpoint of the cent ral authorities. And there are limits, Sagan insists, to how accident-proof large organizations are likely to be. (Sagan is the author of an important 1993 book called The Limits of Safety, which lays out this argument in some detail.) The empirical record, he point outs here, shows that accidents are possible. An Iraqi bomb, the UN inspectors discovered in the early 1990s, would have been “highly unstable” and might have gone off “if it fell off the edge” of a desk. Such an accident, especially if it were to take place near the front lines in a war, might well in his view lead to a major nuclear exchange.

Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers by Jerry Miller, Smithsonian Institution Press, 296 pages, black & white photos, $32.95.

With its subtitle of “How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation” no one is more qualified than Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, USN (Ret.) to lay out in simple and direct language the basis for the military employment of nuclear weapons, how the planning for their potential use during the cold war succeeded in deterring action by adversaries that could have resulted in a third world war, and what the future now holds for their use - or lack thereof - in the maintenance of a peaceful world in the 21st century.

Simply put, while it serves as a useful reference for those military professionals who have been closely involved in the implementation of our defensive strategy since the end of WWII, it also serves as the necessary primer for the vast number of civilians who grew up being conditioned by the media into thinking that we were always just one step from Armageddon with such a fearsome weapon in the hands of military leaders.

Quite the contrary, Jerry Miller makes clear that those who knew the weapon best were the ones who were least likely to use it except to deter its use by others. To accomplish this required increased reliability and accuracy in delivery of the weapon itself along with the security and flexibility of movement inherent in ships at sea as a launching base. It is here that the modern aircraft carrier best filled the role until the onset of the Polaris submarine and subsequently the Trident systems were brought on line. However, none of the foregoing would have been of any use without the toughness of mind and willing support on the part of our civilian leadership of every initiative required to keep this deterrent credible since its first use to end the Pacific war through the remainder of the 20th century.

In his introduction and throughout the text the author provides valuable insights on the character of the many military officers who devoted their lives to not only making the systems work but to planning the national security policies that recognized the variety of scenarios that came into being as a result of nuclear weapons. One very interesting story revolves around the early participation of Naval officers recruited by General Groves (who headed the “Manhattan Project”) to take advantage of their “special scientific skills.” While the Army Air Corps supplied the pilot and crew of the B-29’s, many readers may be surprised to learn that the first nuclear bombs used in anger (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were armed and dropped on the command of two of those Naval officers - one of whom was a Naval aviator as well.

In the light of our present situation following the terrorist attack on the World Trade buildings and the Pentagon where four of our big carriers have been hastily deployed to support operations against the perpetrators in Afghanistan, Jerry Miller’s final summation is prophetic, to wit: While nuclear weapons continue to provide the security umbrella under which civilization can prosper despite the emerging problems of the 21st century, the aircraft carrier appears more attractive than ever in its relevance to national defense. It is a book that should be on everyone’s shelf.

The following book review is by ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), ANA’s Chairman of the Board Emeritus, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Chief of Naval Operations.

Cambodian officials destroyed more than 5,000 weapons in the former Khmer Rouge stronghold Pailin on Wednesday to symbolize peace in the area.

The destruction, in a huge fire, was observed by Tea Banh, a co-defense minister, foreign diplomats and about 1,000 local residents.

Y Chhien, a former bodyguard of the late Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot who is now Pailin’s governor, told reporters the ceremony indicated Cambodia had gained complete peace.

”The consequences of more than two decades of chronic war has resulted in a large number of weapons and explosives, which have caused insecurity, instability and public disorder such as robberies, kidnappings, murders and violent conflicts,” he said.

Mostly light weapons such as assault rifles and handguns were destroyed.

Cambodia began the first weapon destruction ceremony in May 1999 in Phnom Penh, crushing 3,855 weapons.

A senior official in Pailin estimated hundreds of weapons are still illegally held in town areas by former soldiers.

Editorial Abstract: The United States recently announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Major Ruse’s examination of how the treaty restricted the development of our national missile defense system helps us understand what the withdrawal means for the future.

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DID THE 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty hinder American military capability, threaten international strategic stability, or endanger the safety and welfare of our nation and its citizens? Clearly, the Gold War strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the United States and the Soviet Union played a critical role in strategic stability and the prevention of global nuclear war. People saw the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of MAD, but more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, we find numerous and divergent legal, political, and personal views on the ABM Treaty and its impact on our national security strategy. On 13 December 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would pull out of the treaty. In light of that announcement, it is important to reflect on the various legal, political, economic, and military circumstances surrounding this decision if we are to understand the implications it has for our present situation.

In the context of international law, the 1972 ABM Treaty contributed significantly to the rapidly expanding legal discipline of warfare in space. Support of the treaty rose to national relevance and concern following the release in January 2001 of the report of the Space Commission, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his becoming secretary of defense. After its six-month investigation, the commission concluded that “the security and well being of the United States, its allies and friends depend on the nation’s ability to operate in space.” (1) The national security strategy even stated that “the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability and the U.S. is committed to continued efforts to enhance the Treaty’s viability and effectiveness.”

The ABM Treaty clearly had a prominent influence on the national military strategy and an expanding legal influence on future space warfare. The original treaty, however, focused on a much more limited role. As designed, it severely limited the deployment, testing, and use of national missile systems designed to intercept incoming strategic or long-range missiles. Interestingly, the treaty banned a technology that did not even exist in 1972. Specifically, it outlawed national missile defense (NMD) systems in the United States and Soviet Union but did not limit development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems. In the midst of the Gold War, with the two superpowers dominating global military might, the bipolar treaty was adopted to avert a possible nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race. Logic held that if each nation remained defenseless to a nuclear attack and if nuclear retaliation to a first strike were guaranteed, then neither nation would have any motivation to consider launching a nuclear strike. The treaty codified MAD, which prevailed until the fall of communism and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, it seems ironic and contrary to logical thinking that any nation, especially a superpower like the United States, would agree to remain defenseless in hopes of maintaining strategic stability. For whatever reason, the two countries avoided nuclear world war, and MAD prevailed throughout the Cold War. Yet, the idea of developing and fielding antimissile missiles began as early as the 1950s, and President Ronald Reagan formally promoted it in 1983 with his quest for a “peace shield” to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” (3)

In an idealistic world, Reagan preferred nuclear disarmament to achieve nuclear stability, but, realistically, he understood that retaliation would continue to influence world relations. From the beginning, he intended his Strategic Defense Initiative, derisively termed “Star Wars” by the media, as a comprehensive defensive capability–possibly including space-based lasers–that would ensure the ineffectiveness of threats or the use of long-range missiles against the United States and its global interests/allies. He rejected the “logic” of MAD, declaring, “Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them?” (4)

The Clinton administration’s aversion to NMD was based heavily on international promotion of Cold War–era MAD and support for the ABM Treaty, as well as intelligence estimates that foresaw no missile threat outside of Russia. The national intelligence estimate of 1995 concluded that “there would be no threat from long-range ballistic missiles for at least fifteen years.” (5) This staunch, although outdated, support of Cold War strategy took a sharp blow on 14 July 1998, when a congressionally mandated commission led by Rumsfeld released its final report, unanimously concluding that “concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. [These nations] would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability…. During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware th at such a decision had been made.” (6) If this report were not daunting enough, the decisive wake-up call to US vulnerability came just six weeks later when on 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a long-range Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan and 1,000 miles out into the Pacific. (7) Most disturbing was the confirmation that this missile actually contained a third stage which would have provided true intercontinental capability had it not malfunctioned. Despite the undeniable threat, the required technology and associated cost of defending against it remained politically questionable.

On 10 June 1999, an Army theater high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile successfully intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched 120 miles away, thereby validating the “bullet hitting a bullet” technology. (8) By the end of the year, the United States had completed four successful TMD intercept tests and one successful NMD “kinetic kill.” (9) On 23 July 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, authored by Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), which called for deployment of a limited missile defense system “as soon as technologically possible.” (10) Based on estimates that North Korea could have a reliable missile threat to the United States by the year 2005, President Clinton had to make a final decision by the summer of 2000 on whether or not to deploy a limited, land-based NMD system. This decision was based on technology development, affordability, potential threat, international treaty considerations, and competing defense priorities. Three of the 19 planned NMD tests were completed by mid-July 2000. Costing $100 million per test, only one of the three missile intercepts proved successful. (11) Lt Gen Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, testified before Congress that “93 percent of the system’s critical engagement functions have been proven to work properly.” (12) Despite this testimony, and possibly fearing a negative arms control legacy as he prepared to leave office, President Clinton decided on 1 September 2000 to leave his successor with the decision of whether or not to deploy an ABM system, thereby avoiding the treaty amendment or abrogation issue.

As offensive weapons evolve, so must defenses.

T wenty-five years ago, on a cold clear day, I broke my patrol in a quiet orchard on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Looking up into a perfectly blue sky, I saw far above me the tiniest specks, so small that they would disappear and then sparkle vaguely in reappearance. In this barely perceptible, inaudible glitter that seemed not much more than a trick of the eye, men were at that moment fighting for their lives. And years before, at the edge of the Sinai Desert on a moonless January night, I had watched the small lights marking Israeli A-4s rise and fall in silent parabolas like the abstract play of lights in an exhibition at a planetarium.

No one is truly accustomed to the kind of angelic combat, as if from the pages of Milton, that I witnessed on these two occasions, for after thousands of years war is still in the main either Homeric or industrial. But for more than a century it has been moving away from the human scale and into realms of speed, force, and discreet communication associated previously only with the supernatural. The nature of this progression is not always clear, and recognition is not automatic. What I saw as an infantryman suddenly illuminated something I had seen as a boy.

In the summer of 1960, I lived with my family on a mountaintop in the West Indies. Alerted by the BBC, we went out to the terrace one night to look for a round and even light that did not sparkle, the brightest thing in the sky after the sun and moon. This was Echo I, a huge communications satellite that moved in stunning silence across the previously inviolable field of stars. What we did not realize that August was that Echo I was a harbinger of the age of the ballistic missile. The routine launch of satellites meant that orbital trajectories for nuclear weapons would be routine as well. Range, power, and speed had leapt beyond the custom of the imagination. Whether this was paradise lost or paradise regained I do not know, but it was a great acceleration of what I think of as the war of the lights, a war in which victory belongs to those with the best understanding of hitherto abstract qualities.

REDUCING CASUALTIES

Warfare has evolved in a series of moves and countermoves that do not, contrary to popular belief, necessarily lead to more and more horrific weapons and greater and greater casualties. Sometimes the evolution makes for less terrible means of fighting and fewer casualties, when, for example, a destructive stalemate is transformed into a more quickly resolved action of maneuver, as in the case of tanks cutting short First World War battles that otherwise would have lasted longer and taken more men.

Generally speaking, hardening, protection, and weapons that can convert static war into war of maneuver make for a reduction in casualties until the next development. Throughout history statesmen and military leaders have understood that their inescapable obligation is to participate in the never-ending moves and countermoves of this cycle. Though they have done so at times for reasons of conquest, they have done so mainly to preserve the life of a nation and the principles it espouses.

Now we find ourselves in the unusual position of debating whether to make the countermove that would protect us, and eventually others, from the appalling power of nuclear bombs delivered by ballistic missiles. The proposition of mounting a strategic defense seems on its face and at first blush to make sense. When confronted with the threat of immense destruction, one takes action to avert it from kith and kin. It is what one naturally does and what we have always done. It has seen us through and brought us to this point.

But our intellectual elites say this is unsatisfactory. Only in abandoning move and countermove can we do what we intend. In refusing to shatter our ancient custom, we proceed blindly to Armageddon. But the pattern of military competition cannot be broken by will. Will is not transnational. The will of one nation cannot direct the actions of another save by some form of conquest. If two parties are of the same mind they do not have between them a pattern that needs emendation, and if two rival states agree to regulate their antagonism the decision follows rather than precedes the warming of relations and is the recognition rather than the creation of the reality of their affairs. In the absence of an overpowering international regime (the prospect of which delights liberals even as they condemn imperialism), nations will break their agreements as demanded by their interests. This was the fate of the Washington Agreements, particularly the Naval Limitations Treaty, and of the Pact of Locarno, during the aptly named interwar period.

Most arms competitions are not simply rivalries between two parties unaffected by other influences. When the Chinese developed a nuclear capability the Soviets were forced both to increase their own and to strengthen conventional forces in the absence of a nuclear monopoly. This swelled Soviet inventories to an extent that the West could not ignore given the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. And the West’s due diligence in response swayed the Soviets in turn, which no doubt influenced the Chinese, and so on and so forth. Yet even this tripartite dynamic, though somewhat complicated, is flat in comparison to the multidimensional world of complex security calculations.

Much elegant argumentation against strategic defense is based solely upon the balance between the superpowers, with no mention of, for example, North Korean or Iranian missiles. This is partly because it has been theologically correct to deny the obvious imminent arrival of such things, and partly because a case against strategic defense, made without consideration of the lesser but budding powers, nuclear and otherwise, tends to collapse. Is the United States supposed to suffer an attack by a sea-launched terrorist missile or a North Korean ICBM because of arguments about the Soviet-American strategic standoff in the Eighties that were invalid then and are hardly applicable now? Even were they valid then and applicable now, are we supposed to hallucinate away the rapidly developing strategic danger from other quarters?

Now more than ever, military preparations are necessitated not just by military developments but by advances in all areas. Science proceeds apace, creating things for insatiable civilian demand that then become devilishly applicable to military questions. In your 1999 General Motors Nadler you can look at a little screen and see precisely where you are in town. You, as red dot, are at the corner, a few feet in front of the stop sign. Make a right, and there is the entrance to Toys “R” Us. And if you have access to such a precise system of location, so do others.

The Soviet Union eventually could have used-and Russia and others may yet use-global-positioning satellites for the terminal guidance of otherwise relatively less precise re-entry vehicles thrown off a bull’s- eye by weather, wind, and the inexactitude of hurling a warhead on a ballistic track across half the globe. The greatest danger of terminal guidance is not just the attainment of perfect accuracy, which allows far smaller warheads to destroy targets, perhaps doubling or tripling the effect of an existing arsenal and firing all kinds of ambitions. More dangerous even than this would be the real-time end-of-trajectory direction of these warheads onto movable or even moving targets-the heart of American and Russian defenses and the world’s nuclear stability-the assumedly invulnerable rail- or truck-mounted missiles, or ballistic-missile submarines leaving a faint but detectable perturbation of the waters above them. The impetus for such a destabilizing advance comes not from military initiative but from irrepressible developments in the civilian world from which the military cannot insulate itself except by adopting the hopeful delusions of its habitual critics.

WHAT WORKS

The causes of war, evolution of weaponry, dynamics of arms competitions, and need for vigilance notwithstanding, a strategic defense cannot be desirable unless it can work, and most people who have been within 20 miles of a college believe that it can’t. Though it is a mystery that the experts who oppose it on the ground that it is impossible also believe it can be destabilizing, in the academy wonders never cease. The voice of a certain orthodoxy says that strategic defense won’t work, and with each advance that same voice retrenches to condemn what has yet to be perfected.

One of the perils of success is the temptation to continue to operate the way that brought success, even after conditions change. The United States won the Cold War, at least in part, by producing weapons so sophisticated that the Soviet Union went broke trying to compete. (The same weapons performed superbly in the Persian Gulf War.) But success in the post-Cold War, post-Desert Storm world may require a new approach or, at the very least, a period of time to stop and rethink.

At the moment, the Pentagon is planning to purchase an array of expensive, high-tech systems conceived during the Cold War. A few of these systems have been canceled, but many remain in the pipeline, including the Air Force’s F-22 fighter and B-2 bomber, the Navy’s Seawolf attack submarine and the Marine Corps’ V-22 tilt-rotor transport. Each of these systems will cost billions of dollars more than upgrades of existing systems. And each will present the commanders of the next war with a major dilemma: These weapons will be too expensive and rare to risk on an everyday basis - and when they’re too expensive to lose, they’re too expensive to use.

At this point, one thing should be said: These weapons should not be canceled just to save money; there will be a temptation to do this. It is true that the present political trend is to increase defense spending, or at least hold it steady. It also is true that much of the increase recently promised by President Clinton and much of the increase the Republicans are talking about will go to enhance current military readiness, which is proper. There is no doubt that the cuts of the last five years went too deep, too fast. But an excessive emphasis on current operations also is misguided, and money should not be taken from research and development, or R&D, to rectify past mistakes. At some point, America will need a new generation of weapons.

But this does not mean that the current generation should be procured as originally conceived. They must be designed for the proper threat environment. There must be a reevaluation before these weapons are deemed essential, in lieu of upgrades to existing systems. They must be shown to support the current (probably interim) national strategy put forth in the Bottom-Up Review, fighting two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously. They must relate to the capabilities of enemies who might possess some state-of-the-art weaponry, but not a truly modern integrated force. And, although some redundancy is always desirable, it is too costly to buy systems that duplicate each other. The military is debating what the roles of each service should be. That debate should determine the value of redundant weapons systems in various branches of the military, but redundancy should not result from the desire of each service to have as much as possible unto itself.

The time for the Pentagon to rethink is now, since the military strategy decided during the next two years will determine the force for the next 10 to 15 years and beyond. Here are some specific issues to be raised.

The Air Force wants to buy 485 F-22 fighter aircraft at $165 million each. The recent decision to marginally slow the program means that the final per-unit price will be higher, not including inevitable cost overruns, training and support equipment. This purchase may even be unnecessary, since no fighter in the world can match existing U.S. fighters and pilots. The F-22 is an air-superiority fighter, designed to ensure U.S. ground forces operate free of enemy air attack. True, air superiority is not a God-given natural right of the United States, and the competitive edge must be retained. But if we buy the F-22, who and what will it fight?

Last fall, 60 Minutes aired an interview with Air Force Gen. Richard Hawley, who defended the acquisition of the F-22s by specifically pointing to the threat of deployed Soviet-made MiG-29s, MiG-31s and Su-27s, and U.S.-made F-15s and F-16s in foreign hands. While these planes are formidable and can be upgraded, they are no match for present U.S. fighters. Further, the majority of Soviet-built fighters that continue to fly routinely are in friendly or neutral countries. The remainder are seeing little flight time, due to lack of fuel and spare parts, and many are up for sale. As time passes, more of these planes will be unable to fly and perhaps cannibalized for parts.

Hawley continued to warn of a possible threat from countries that have purchased top-of-the-line American fighters; friends now could be foes later. This is questionable. The United States usually is careful to sell weapons only to countries that historically have been our allies. Besides, we do not sell the latest models or upgrades of an aircraft even to our European allies, so America retains the technological edge.

The Europeans (and, to a much lesser extent, the Israelis) have the money and technology to build a new fighter. But these are allies. And, anyway, upgrades of current U.S. models could counter anything they might sell.

That leaves the Russians. A few design bureaus appear to be active, and they certainly regard the export of weapons as a major source of hard currency. But it is questionable whether they could produce the advanced avionics or guarantee other countries a steady parts and maintenance stream. Iran, for example, is buying its own parts factories from the Russians. And indeed, one almost is tempted to conclude that, should the Russians produce a truly threatening fighter, it would be cheaper and better for all concerned for the United States just to buy up the production!

Another case in point is the B-2 stealth bomber. The Air Force has purchased 20 of these at more than $800 million each. Northrop, the prime contractor, has offered to build 20 more for about $530 million each. But what will these weapons be used for?

Current thinking is that if a major war breaks out, heavy stealth bombers, equipped with precision-guided munitions, will fill the gap, mauling the enemy until ground forces arrive. This may be true, but that does not mean that the B-2 is the perfect weapon.

One reason is that stealth itself is not perfect. Stealth is not a single component, but a variety of attributes. During the gulf war, British radar was able to track our F-117s. The reason the planes weren’t picked up on Iraqi radar was that they flew through corridors where the radar already had been knocked out by F-4 “Wild Weasels,” routinely flown to protect aircraft. In addition, Saddam Hussein was afraid to activate his surface-to-air, or SAM, radar because the Wild Weasels and their antiradar missiles could knock them out. Stealth aircraft are not vital if the enemy loses - or doesn’t turn on - its radar.

Furthermore, the B-2, originally designed as an anti-Soviet nuclear bomber, needs expensive modifications to carry conventional munitions - missiles that can be launched from a range of platforms, including tactical aircraft, surface ships, submarines and even U-Haul trucks. Today, smart munitions are more important than the platforms that carry them; it’s smarter to spread a lot of munitions over a lot of platforms than to be dependent on a few. What will happen when the first B-2 is shot down? At the very least, the technology will become available for study by the bad guys. At worst, the planes will be withdrawn from the conflict. It is possible to conclude that, while R&D should proceed vigorously on new fighters and bombers, the United States will be better served by upgrading existing systems.

Attack submarines present a similar problem. These ships were designed to hunt Soviet subs. Since the evaporation of the Soviet threat, the Navy has emphasized the other roles of subs: firing cruise missiles, reconnaissance, special operations and protecting U.S. ships from enemy subs more than 30 nations have submarines). The end of the Cold War found the United States between generations of these ships, preparing to shift from the Los Angeles-class to the Seawolf. The Navy has been working to develop a smaller attack sub, appropriate to the new environment. But two Seawolfs are being built, with the possibility of more, just to keep the two shipyards (in Connecticut and Virginia) open, at least until after the 1996 election. Advocates for the sub claim that two yards must be maintained to preserve our domestic military manufacturing base. But at $2.4 billion a copy, the Seawolf is an expensive way to do it. And, like the F-22 fighter and B-2 bomber, the question must be asked: Who and what is it going to fight?

BALAD AIR BASE, Iraq — In an effort to keep pace with the ever-changing face of close-quarters combat, F-16 Fighting Falcon crews here plan to use a new, lightweight satellite-guided munition soon.

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The GBU-38 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition is designed to reduce collateral damage, limit unintended casualties, and take the fight up close and personal to enemy insurgents and anti-Iraqi forces alike.

Although they will not be the first in theater to drop the newest JDAM in the U.S. arsenal, munitions specialists, maintainers, and aircrews dedicated to keeping the bite of the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron “Black Widows” lethal are saying, “Let’s Roll.”

As specialists and maintainers fine tune the basics to certify the GBU-38 on F-16s based here from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, elsewhere in the area the new JDAM has already proved to be a thorn in the side of those who choose to impede the Iraqi reconstruction effort.

Two F-16s from an undisclosed location completed the first successful combat drop of GBU-38s on Oct. 4, 2004, during a precision strike on a confirmed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi terrorist meeting. The two released JDAMs precisely struck the terrorist hideout causing only minimal collateral damage.

“We’re ready to go and just waiting on the final steps in the approval process,” said Senior Master Sgt. Douglas Baker, 332nd Expeditionary Equipment Maintenance Squadron munitions flight chief. “After receipt of our JDAM tail fin kits in late October, my munitions crew produced sufficient quantities of the new JDAM to support our mission requirements in only 24 hours.”

Additionally, Baker said the new weapon greatly enhances the capabilities of the Black Widows by giving them an additional choice of weapon that performs well in a confined, inner-city environment.

Normally with new equipment and cutting-edge technology, one can expect a certain degree of difficulty or steep learning curve to be associated with the product; however, during the initial build, munitions crewmembers found the newest version the easiest to assemble of all the JDAM line-up.

“We prefer building this JDAM over the others simply because it is much easier to work with the smaller weapon compared to the 2,000-pound JDAM we routinely call the monster,” Baker said.

“The focus and level of teamwork we used in building the initial complement of GBU-38s was high. There is a profound likelihood these weapons will be expended on each mission here, so it was imperative for us to learn and follow the new procedures to the letter,” said Tech. Sgt. Patrick Van Vranken, 332nd EMXS munitions flight production supervisor. “After all, it is all about bombs on target in this environment,” he said. Van Vranken oversaw the initial assembly of the new JDAMs here.

“Anytime you experience a new weapons system, it is interesting and challenging all at the same time,” Van Vranken said. “We have to do it right each and every time. Our Army, Navy, and Marine counterparts expect no less and need this support on the ground; they need this firepower.”

A light infantry company’s medium machineguns, 60mm mortars, and antiarmor weapons are key to its ability to succeed in combat. The machineguns and mortars allow it to achieve fire superiority and provide a base of suppressive fire for maneuver elements to close with the enemy by reaching positions in defilade with high explosive, obscuring enemy fires with white phosphorus, or desynchronizing the enemy’s ability to fight by well-placed indirect fire. The Dragon or Javelin will provide the company’s only organic antiarmor capability. When positioned properly, these weapons can initiate a well-placed antiarmor ambush or defense of an obstacle. To reach their full potential, however, these squads must have training that goes beyond qualification and sustainment.

Weapons squads are a part of the task organization of the rifle platoon. Generally, this translates into a weapons squad leader (staff sergeant) and two gun teams, each consisting of a gunner (corporal), an assistant gunner (private first class), and an ammunition bearer. These are the same soldiers who often wind up as the antiarmor teams, because dedicated personnel for the teams are not available.

The training of the weapons squad is the primary responsibility of the weapons squad leader, the platoon sergeant, and the platoon leader. They provide the platoon with its base of fire and constitute a sizable amount of its firepower. But they do not reach their potential because operating tempo and lack of experience at the junior officer level make it difficult just to maintain qualifications and support maneuver exercises.

The second lieutenant usually takes a rifle platoon as his first assignment. In the best cases, he has three rifle squads, a weapons squad, and a headquarters, consisting of the platoon sergeant, a medic, a radiotelephone operator, and himself. He probably gets about 12 months in this job, but not always.

In a garrison environment, he and the platoon sergeant manage all the administrative aspects of the platoon, from awards, physical training, equipment accountability and serviceability, weapons qualification, and a host of other things to get ready for a readiness cycle or a training deployment. He is also involved in planning training for his squads during upcoming tactical environments if the training exercise permits.

In a tactical or field environment, he supervises squad training (both force-on-force and maneuver live-fire exercises) and executes platoon training as part of a company or battalion directed event. Most of what the platoon does consists of battle drills at the squad and platoon level. The average second lieutenant is leaving his first job about the time he really begins to understand what needs to be done. The thinking is that he can rely on the real constants in a company–the NCOs–to help him ensure that things are done to standard. But what about time to take that training to a level beyond qualification, to a higher standard?

On the other hand, the rifle company executive officer (XO) probably has had a specialty platoon that gave him an appreciation of mobility and counter-mobility, integration of an assortment of direct and indirect fire weapons into the fight, and most of all, experience. The average XO has about two years of experience in the battalion. He understands the commander’s intent better, can formulate a solid training plan within the commander’s guidance, and can conceptualize nonstandard training events. He understands relationships between time available for training due to battalion driven events, how to obtain training areas and ammunition, and how the battalion functions. He is one step away from a company command. What better officer to put in charge of training the soldiers who constitute the company’s organic firepower?

The platoons will still be task organized with two machinegun teams if the mission requires it. I am not advocating removing the platoon’s base of fire, but not every mission requires two machinegun teams, or an antiarmor capability at platoon level. Often the mission is better served with the company’s firepower concentrated and directed to best support the momentum of the attack.

As many times as we practice a platoon mission, it does not require many casualties to make a platoon ineffective. A company stands a much greater chance of succeeding than a platoon, no matter what the odds might be. Platoons seize parts of an objective or allow another portion of the platoon or company to move forward. A habitual relationship should be formed between platoons and weapons squads, but they should be consolidated at the company level for training and tasked out as directed in the commander’s order.

Consolidating the weapons squads under the XO has other benefits as well. The company mortars and machineguns can be synchronized by the XO from a consolidated support-by-fire (SBF) position. An appropriate weapons mix within the SBF has a better chance of suppressing or destroying key aspects of the enemy’s defenses. Four M240 machineguns and two Javelins initiating the direct-fire portion of an attack–while 60mm fires harass enemy positions, or screen the maneuver element attempting to gain a foothold–stand a better chance if they are well coordinated.

With technical innovations–such as the soldier intercom system, night vision devices (NVDs), better optics, and laser aiming devices–fires can be redirected quickly as maneuver elements become bogged down or other elements are passed through. This level of synchronization reduces the risk of fratricide because the less independent elements are firing into the objective. It reduces the loss of soldiers to enemy fire, because a heavy volume of well-placed fire is moved onto the enemy as necessary.

This level of synchronization does not automatically come from three weapons squads from three platoons task organized into a company SBF for a specific mission. Instead, it requires that the company base of fire train its individual parts as a whole all of the time. Every maneuver live-fire range I have seen suffered from several problems. The surface danger zones (range fans) require that only certain positions be occupied as an SBF. These positions are too close to the objective because the closer the SBF, the narrower the fan. If it were farther away, the left and right limits would inhibit maneuver onto the objective. This is a part of maximizing safety while being able to integrate all of the company’s organic direct-fire weapons.

This method of training does not train all aspects of providing a base of fire for a maneuver element. Like indirect fires, which are governed by a similar set of guidelines, it does exercise some of the coordination pieces, but not as many of the required skills–such as concentration of direct and indirect fires or shifting all weapons in the SBF to sustain momentum. It’s not easy to achieve overlapping beaten zones in front of the element moving across the objective while simultaneously neutralizing bunkers and destroying vehicles with missiles or providing indirect fires that screen, mark targets, or isolate the objective. Units must train for this, and train hard. You can’t just show up at the fight and hope to pull that off.

Since most maneuver ranges will not let you fire dud-producing munitions into a range that will be reoccupied the following day or week by another unit, or that do not have targets at longer ranges from which you can actually shift fires, you are forced to run a nonstandard training program. This program should consist of individual training such as separate ranges, coordinated rehearsals such as rock drills, and integrated live-fire exercises.

The leaders within the consolidated weapons section should attend individual training on qualification ranges, as a minimum. For example, the mortar squad leaders and section sergeant should have an understanding of things like the fire control and distribution required of an M240 gunner. Conversely, the weapons squad leader should be thinking about such things as how a short round of white phosphorus could affect his part of the mission. This kind of appreciation can go a long way in preventing or quickly solving problems that are bound to occur when things are most critical. It will also make the most of training resources.

The capstone training event is an integrated live-fire exercise that would replicate in both intensity and duration the fire support of a maneuver element’s movement onto and across the objective. Most impact areas have ranges or sections dedicated to indirect fire weapons and attack aviation, and these areas are usually target rich with old combat engineer vehicles, tanks, personnel carriers, and assorted other objects. The area selected should provide targets that require shifts laterally and in depth, and should also support range fans for all the weapons to be fired.

In the last 10 years, 2 million children have been killed in conflicts alone where small arms have been used, 5 million have been disabled and 12 million left homeless. Many have been exploited as combatants, forced themselves to kill or be killed.

Civilians are coming under increasing threat from the spread of small arms and light weapons and their illegal trade. These “weapons of choice” in 46 out of the 49 major conflicts since 1990 have devastated whole societies and caused untold agony. They have triggered 4 million deaths–about 90 per cent civilian and 80 per Cent women and children–as well as the displacement of huge populations. More than 500 million small arms and light weapons are currently in circulation the world over-1 for about every 12 people. And they continue to pose an enormous humanitarian challenge, particularly in internal conflicts where insurgent militias fight against government forces, and civilians are the deliberate targets of violence. It is no wonder that Secretary-General Kofi Annan called small arms “weapons of mass destruction” in terms of the carnage they cause.

While estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s trade of small arms is legal, those weapons often find their way into the illicit market. These include leftovers from the cold war, especially in developing countries: In Afghanistan, there are some 10 million of these weapons; in West Africa, an estimated 7 million; and in Central America, about 2 million. Arms stolen or captured from state security forces provide another major source of black-market supply around the world.
In societies awash with illicit weapons, resort to violence leads to a vicious cycle of even greater demand for arms. According to two major United Nations studies carried out by small arms experts and presented to the General Assembly in 1997 and 1999, illicit trafficking in small arms plays a major role in the violence that permeates some societies, perpetuating a variety of social ills in countries or regions. Excessive flows of illegal small arms destabilize Governments, encourage crime and foster terrorism.

International cooperation in arresting the problem is crucial. Some States need help at the national level in developing or strengthening legislation to control the flow of these weapons, while others need to build capacity in creating more effective law enforcement mechanisms.

Controlling the illegal trade in small arms does not lend itself to easy answers. Small weapons mean big business for dealers–no taxes, no customs, enormous profit margins. Adding to the danger, the vast supply of small arms leads to cut-throat prices. In some parts of the world, an AK-47 assault rifle can be bought or traded for less than $20. There is also a clear link between small arms and drug trafficking–something underpinned by criminal organizations that deal in both commodities.

Yet, momentum has been building to tackle the many sides of the problem-the manufacture, brokering and transport and, most importantly, the use of small arms. The General Assembly in 1999 decided to convene the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which will take place from 9 to 20 July 2001 in New York. The debate on measures to tackle the problem begins with the reaffirmation of the legal and protected right of each Member State to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against it. However, that aspect must be balanced by the threat to international peace and security that excessive small arms pose to a country or region.

The Conference’s draft programme of action suggests action at the national, regional and global levels, and recommends how States can follow through with such measures, individually and together. Some of these measures include stockpile management and, through collection and destruction, reduction of the illegal weapons. Other suggested measures aimed at tracing weapons include record keeping, export-control measures, exchange of information, and controlling weapons transactions by dealing with brokering and financing activities, as well as control through marking.

RELATED ARTICLE: Legal Framework against Illegal Arms

While the 2001 UN Conference and its Preparatory Committee are dealing with the destabilizing accumulation and spread of military-style small arms and light weapons within the context of international security and disarmament, another negotiating process took place in Vienna, Austria. Delegations there agreed on 2 March on a legally binding Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which is designed to supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo, Italy in December 2000. Once entered into force, the Protocol will provide an international law enforcement mechanism for crime prevention and the prosecution of firearms traffickers. Among other things, it would establish internationally recognized standards and provisions regarding marking, record keeping and import/export control.