Blurring the line between R & D and operations: the Missile Defense Agency’s acquisition approach
Dramatic changes have been made in the way in which the Department of Defense develops and procures weapon systems. There is a movement away from the strict requirements-based approach that emphasized a formalized identification of deficiencies, an identifiable and predictable threat, and strict system performance parameters. In the vanguard of this defense acquisition process revolution is the Missile Defense Agency’s embrace of capabilities-based acquisition and spiral development. Since its adoption of these processes in January 2002, the MDA has made remarkable progress in restructuring its approach to the development of a fully integrated ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). The MDA is now faced, however, with an even larger–and perhaps more difficult–task: turning these principles into formalized and institutionalized programmatic processes in the face of significant cultural and organizational challenges. Those challenges are based on the fact that MDA’s approach significantly alters the the traditional roles and responsibilities of acquisition organizations, operational units, and contractors.
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The MDA’s approach is unprecedented for such a large program. Although some DoD acquisition organizations have, in the past, bridged the organizational and cultural gap between research and development and operational use, the BMDS will be the first large-scale program that comes into operation while still, in effect, in an R & D mode. This capability-based approach calls into question who “owns” the particular system and significantly alters the traditional DoD role of the acquisition community.
Although much of MDA’s acquisition approach is still undergoing refinement, the fundamental precepts are in place. Despite recent testing setbacks, a rudimentary missile defense system will soon go operational, the overall BMDS program management of the system remaining with MDA. There will be no formal turnover from the acquisition community to the Services for many of the missile defense elements and components. MDA will concurrently test and operate the BMDS while on alert, and day-to-day operations will be performed by a mix of contractors, National Guard, and servicemembers. Contractor logistics support (versus a large Service-led logistics “tail”) will be the key to maintaining the system. These initiatives are a significant break with existing DoD processes and will serve as a model for the development and fielding of large-scale future joint systems.
Unique Nature of the BMDS Program
There is a well-established and formalized process for transitioning a system from R & D to operational use that allows the Service to formally identify and allocate funding to operate the system, to train personnel, and to develop logistics procedures. A variety of factors, however, will require the BMDS to operate in a manner that is not in clear concert with the existing DoD processes. Although these factors are unique, they have relevance to other future high tech joint systems. A major issue is that BMDS elements and components will be fielded in very small numbers; for example, only a handful of ground-based mid-course interceptors are initially planned. This is in contrast with most weapon systems, which are produced using a fairly rigid lockstep process, manufactured in mass quantities, and often require a long logistics and maintenance tail. A modern BMDS negates the need for a large number of military personnel to be identified, trained, and equipped.
Another unique factor is that unlike most DoD weapon systems under development currently, the BMDS will provide a new capability that is non-existent today: the interception and destruction of an incoming ballistic missile. Since the BMDS provides a new capability, integration testing–both horizontally and vertically–occurs across the entire system, as opposed to the long series of formalized processes and regression tests that are necessary to ensure that adding a new capability does not degrade existing capabilities. The lack of any current capability today to defeat a ballistic missile attack negates the need to defer fielding of the BMDS.
Another consideration is the unprecedented level of integration required among BMDS early warning sensors, weapons sensors, and interceptors. The speed required to track, identify, and engage a ballistic missile calls for an extraordinary level of sensor fusion. No single sensor or weapon can achieve the capability required to engage a ballistic missile traveling at high speeds across oceans and continents. Only through continued, centralized management of all BMD systems will MDA be successful in developing a program that meets the unique characteristics of a missile defense engagement.
Restructuring the Missile Defense Program
MDA’s approach was brought about by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s January 2002 memorandum on MDA program direction, which fundamentally restructured the missile defense program by canceling the missile defense operational requirements documents (ORDs). This was the most fundamental redirection of the missile defense program since its inception in 1983. Like all ORDs, the missile defense ORDs mandated discrete and exact levels of effectiveness (key performance parameters) for each missile defense element. A theater air and missile defense capstone requirements document was also established; it laid out the overall framework for the entire missile defense mission.