Reflections on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and national missile defense
Editorial Abstract: The United States recently announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Major Ruse’s examination of how the treaty restricted the development of our national missile defense system helps us understand what the withdrawal means for the future.
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DID THE 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty hinder American military capability, threaten international strategic stability, or endanger the safety and welfare of our nation and its citizens? Clearly, the Gold War strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the United States and the Soviet Union played a critical role in strategic stability and the prevention of global nuclear war. People saw the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of MAD, but more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, we find numerous and divergent legal, political, and personal views on the ABM Treaty and its impact on our national security strategy. On 13 December 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would pull out of the treaty. In light of that announcement, it is important to reflect on the various legal, political, economic, and military circumstances surrounding this decision if we are to understand the implications it has for our present situation.
In the context of international law, the 1972 ABM Treaty contributed significantly to the rapidly expanding legal discipline of warfare in space. Support of the treaty rose to national relevance and concern following the release in January 2001 of the report of the Space Commission, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his becoming secretary of defense. After its six-month investigation, the commission concluded that “the security and well being of the United States, its allies and friends depend on the nation’s ability to operate in space.” (1) The national security strategy even stated that “the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability and the U.S. is committed to continued efforts to enhance the Treaty’s viability and effectiveness.”
The ABM Treaty clearly had a prominent influence on the national military strategy and an expanding legal influence on future space warfare. The original treaty, however, focused on a much more limited role. As designed, it severely limited the deployment, testing, and use of national missile systems designed to intercept incoming strategic or long-range missiles. Interestingly, the treaty banned a technology that did not even exist in 1972. Specifically, it outlawed national missile defense (NMD) systems in the United States and Soviet Union but did not limit development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems. In the midst of the Gold War, with the two superpowers dominating global military might, the bipolar treaty was adopted to avert a possible nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race. Logic held that if each nation remained defenseless to a nuclear attack and if nuclear retaliation to a first strike were guaranteed, then neither nation would have any motivation to consider launching a nuclear strike. The treaty codified MAD, which prevailed until the fall of communism and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, it seems ironic and contrary to logical thinking that any nation, especially a superpower like the United States, would agree to remain defenseless in hopes of maintaining strategic stability. For whatever reason, the two countries avoided nuclear world war, and MAD prevailed throughout the Cold War. Yet, the idea of developing and fielding antimissile missiles began as early as the 1950s, and President Ronald Reagan formally promoted it in 1983 with his quest for a “peace shield” to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” (3)
In an idealistic world, Reagan preferred nuclear disarmament to achieve nuclear stability, but, realistically, he understood that retaliation would continue to influence world relations. From the beginning, he intended his Strategic Defense Initiative, derisively termed “Star Wars” by the media, as a comprehensive defensive capability–possibly including space-based lasers–that would ensure the ineffectiveness of threats or the use of long-range missiles against the United States and its global interests/allies. He rejected the “logic” of MAD, declaring, “Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them?” (4)
The Clinton administration’s aversion to NMD was based heavily on international promotion of Cold War–era MAD and support for the ABM Treaty, as well as intelligence estimates that foresaw no missile threat outside of Russia. The national intelligence estimate of 1995 concluded that “there would be no threat from long-range ballistic missiles for at least fifteen years.” (5) This staunch, although outdated, support of Cold War strategy took a sharp blow on 14 July 1998, when a congressionally mandated commission led by Rumsfeld released its final report, unanimously concluding that “concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. [These nations] would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability…. During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware th at such a decision had been made.” (6) If this report were not daunting enough, the decisive wake-up call to US vulnerability came just six weeks later when on 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a long-range Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan and 1,000 miles out into the Pacific. (7) Most disturbing was the confirmation that this missile actually contained a third stage which would have provided true intercontinental capability had it not malfunctioned. Despite the undeniable threat, the required technology and associated cost of defending against it remained politically questionable.
On 10 June 1999, an Army theater high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile successfully intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched 120 miles away, thereby validating the “bullet hitting a bullet” technology. (8) By the end of the year, the United States had completed four successful TMD intercept tests and one successful NMD “kinetic kill.” (9) On 23 July 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, authored by Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), which called for deployment of a limited missile defense system “as soon as technologically possible.” (10) Based on estimates that North Korea could have a reliable missile threat to the United States by the year 2005, President Clinton had to make a final decision by the summer of 2000 on whether or not to deploy a limited, land-based NMD system. This decision was based on technology development, affordability, potential threat, international treaty considerations, and competing defense priorities. Three of the 19 planned NMD tests were completed by mid-July 2000. Costing $100 million per test, only one of the three missile intercepts proved successful. (11) Lt Gen Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, testified before Congress that “93 percent of the system’s critical engagement functions have been proven to work properly.” (12) Despite this testimony, and possibly fearing a negative arms control legacy as he prepared to leave office, President Clinton decided on 1 September 2000 to leave his successor with the decision of whether or not to deploy an ABM system, thereby avoiding the treaty amendment or abrogation issue.