Too expensive to lose, too expensive to use - weapons systems
One of the perils of success is the temptation to continue to operate the way that brought success, even after conditions change. The United States won the Cold War, at least in part, by producing weapons so sophisticated that the Soviet Union went broke trying to compete. (The same weapons performed superbly in the Persian Gulf War.) But success in the post-Cold War, post-Desert Storm world may require a new approach or, at the very least, a period of time to stop and rethink.
At the moment, the Pentagon is planning to purchase an array of expensive, high-tech systems conceived during the Cold War. A few of these systems have been canceled, but many remain in the pipeline, including the Air Force’s F-22 fighter and B-2 bomber, the Navy’s Seawolf attack submarine and the Marine Corps’ V-22 tilt-rotor transport. Each of these systems will cost billions of dollars more than upgrades of existing systems. And each will present the commanders of the next war with a major dilemma: These weapons will be too expensive and rare to risk on an everyday basis - and when they’re too expensive to lose, they’re too expensive to use.
At this point, one thing should be said: These weapons should not be canceled just to save money; there will be a temptation to do this. It is true that the present political trend is to increase defense spending, or at least hold it steady. It also is true that much of the increase recently promised by President Clinton and much of the increase the Republicans are talking about will go to enhance current military readiness, which is proper. There is no doubt that the cuts of the last five years went too deep, too fast. But an excessive emphasis on current operations also is misguided, and money should not be taken from research and development, or R&D, to rectify past mistakes. At some point, America will need a new generation of weapons.
But this does not mean that the current generation should be procured as originally conceived. They must be designed for the proper threat environment. There must be a reevaluation before these weapons are deemed essential, in lieu of upgrades to existing systems. They must be shown to support the current (probably interim) national strategy put forth in the Bottom-Up Review, fighting two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously. They must relate to the capabilities of enemies who might possess some state-of-the-art weaponry, but not a truly modern integrated force. And, although some redundancy is always desirable, it is too costly to buy systems that duplicate each other. The military is debating what the roles of each service should be. That debate should determine the value of redundant weapons systems in various branches of the military, but redundancy should not result from the desire of each service to have as much as possible unto itself.
The time for the Pentagon to rethink is now, since the military strategy decided during the next two years will determine the force for the next 10 to 15 years and beyond. Here are some specific issues to be raised.
The Air Force wants to buy 485 F-22 fighter aircraft at $165 million each. The recent decision to marginally slow the program means that the final per-unit price will be higher, not including inevitable cost overruns, training and support equipment. This purchase may even be unnecessary, since no fighter in the world can match existing U.S. fighters and pilots. The F-22 is an air-superiority fighter, designed to ensure U.S. ground forces operate free of enemy air attack. True, air superiority is not a God-given natural right of the United States, and the competitive edge must be retained. But if we buy the F-22, who and what will it fight?
Last fall, 60 Minutes aired an interview with Air Force Gen. Richard Hawley, who defended the acquisition of the F-22s by specifically pointing to the threat of deployed Soviet-made MiG-29s, MiG-31s and Su-27s, and U.S.-made F-15s and F-16s in foreign hands. While these planes are formidable and can be upgraded, they are no match for present U.S. fighters. Further, the majority of Soviet-built fighters that continue to fly routinely are in friendly or neutral countries. The remainder are seeing little flight time, due to lack of fuel and spare parts, and many are up for sale. As time passes, more of these planes will be unable to fly and perhaps cannibalized for parts.
Hawley continued to warn of a possible threat from countries that have purchased top-of-the-line American fighters; friends now could be foes later. This is questionable. The United States usually is careful to sell weapons only to countries that historically have been our allies. Besides, we do not sell the latest models or upgrades of an aircraft even to our European allies, so America retains the technological edge.
The Europeans (and, to a much lesser extent, the Israelis) have the money and technology to build a new fighter. But these are allies. And, anyway, upgrades of current U.S. models could counter anything they might sell.
That leaves the Russians. A few design bureaus appear to be active, and they certainly regard the export of weapons as a major source of hard currency. But it is questionable whether they could produce the advanced avionics or guarantee other countries a steady parts and maintenance stream. Iran, for example, is buying its own parts factories from the Russians. And indeed, one almost is tempted to conclude that, should the Russians produce a truly threatening fighter, it would be cheaper and better for all concerned for the United States just to buy up the production!
Another case in point is the B-2 stealth bomber. The Air Force has purchased 20 of these at more than $800 million each. Northrop, the prime contractor, has offered to build 20 more for about $530 million each. But what will these weapons be used for?
Current thinking is that if a major war breaks out, heavy stealth bombers, equipped with precision-guided munitions, will fill the gap, mauling the enemy until ground forces arrive. This may be true, but that does not mean that the B-2 is the perfect weapon.
One reason is that stealth itself is not perfect. Stealth is not a single component, but a variety of attributes. During the gulf war, British radar was able to track our F-117s. The reason the planes weren’t picked up on Iraqi radar was that they flew through corridors where the radar already had been knocked out by F-4 “Wild Weasels,” routinely flown to protect aircraft. In addition, Saddam Hussein was afraid to activate his surface-to-air, or SAM, radar because the Wild Weasels and their antiradar missiles could knock them out. Stealth aircraft are not vital if the enemy loses - or doesn’t turn on - its radar.
Furthermore, the B-2, originally designed as an anti-Soviet nuclear bomber, needs expensive modifications to carry conventional munitions - missiles that can be launched from a range of platforms, including tactical aircraft, surface ships, submarines and even U-Haul trucks. Today, smart munitions are more important than the platforms that carry them; it’s smarter to spread a lot of munitions over a lot of platforms than to be dependent on a few. What will happen when the first B-2 is shot down? At the very least, the technology will become available for study by the bad guys. At worst, the planes will be withdrawn from the conflict. It is possible to conclude that, while R&D should proceed vigorously on new fighters and bombers, the United States will be better served by upgrading existing systems.
Attack submarines present a similar problem. These ships were designed to hunt Soviet subs. Since the evaporation of the Soviet threat, the Navy has emphasized the other roles of subs: firing cruise missiles, reconnaissance, special operations and protecting U.S. ships from enemy subs more than 30 nations have submarines). The end of the Cold War found the United States between generations of these ships, preparing to shift from the Los Angeles-class to the Seawolf. The Navy has been working to develop a smaller attack sub, appropriate to the new environment. But two Seawolfs are being built, with the possibility of more, just to keep the two shipyards (in Connecticut and Virginia) open, at least until after the 1996 election. Advocates for the sub claim that two yards must be maintained to preserve our domestic military manufacturing base. But at $2.4 billion a copy, the Seawolf is an expensive way to do it. And, like the F-22 fighter and B-2 bomber, the question must be asked: Who and what is it going to fight?